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 Distinguishing disparate treatment and disparate impact, the primary 
concepts of illegal discrimination first employed in seminal decisions1 
interpreting and applying Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 may seem 
straightforward and simple. Disparate treatment analysis asks whether an 
agent of an employer has taken into account some protected status, such as 
the five specified in Title VII,3 whether or not with animus, in taking some 
employment action.4 Disparate impact analysis asks whether an agent of the 
employer has taken some action under a policy or practice that has 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (disparate treatment); Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. 
3 Section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, prohibits race, color, religion, sex, and national origin 
discrimination. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978 added pregnancy effectively as a sixth 
category by expanding the definition of sex to include pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). See also TAN 
59-61. 
4 The Court in numerous decisions has made clear that the disparate treatment proscribed by Title VII 
encompasses any consideration of a protected status category that causes an adverse employment-related 
decision, regardless of whether this proscribed consideration is animus-based. See, e.g., International 
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199-200 (1991) (“the absence of a malevolent 
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect”); 
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668-660 (1987) (upholding finding of unions’ intentional 
discrimination despite “no suggestion below that the Unions held any racial animus against or denigrated 
blacks”); Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 5463 U.S. 1073, 1084 (1983) (“use of sex-segregated 
actuarial tables to calculate retirement benefits violates Title VII whether or not the tables reflect an 
accurate prediction of the longevity of women as a class …”).  
Title VII’s disparate treatment cause of action, which protects only the five listed status categories, 
thus differs from the Constitution’s equal protection standard, which potentially protects any status group, 
but requires proof of some level of animus or lack of equal regard, even for classifications – unlike race -- 
that do not raise heightened suspicions of such animus for the Court. See, e.g., Rohmer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 635 (1996) (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper 
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”); City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (“requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational 
prejudice against the mildly retarded”); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 588 
(1979) (“we are necessarily confronted with the question whether the rule reflects an impermissible bias 
against a special class“ of narcotic users).  See generally John Ely, Democracy and Distrust 135-97 (1980). 
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disproportionate adverse effects on members of a group defined by a 
protected status.5 The former is illegal regardless of any business 
justification, except in rare cases where a protected status (other than race or 
color) is used as a bona fide occupational qualification.6 The latter is illegal 
only where an employer cannot demonstrate an over weighing necessary 
business goal or the plaintiff can demonstrate an alternate means to achieve 
such a demonstrated goal without the adverse effects.7 Under current law, 
the former warrants legal as well as equitable relief, while the latter warrants 
only the equitable.8 
 
 But even the wise men and women on the Supreme Court continue to 
have difficulty distinguishing the two. In two decisions in the 2014-2015 
Term, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.9 and Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc.,10 the Court seemed 
to give contradictory answers to an important unresolved conceptual 
definitional question: Does disparate treatment include assigning members 
of a protected group based on their protected  status to a larger disfavored 
group that is defined by neutral principles and that includes others who are 
not members of the protected group? Or does such assignment have only a 
disparate impact on the protected status group?  
 
 In Young, the first of these decisions, all members of the Court, 
though divided on the appropriate analysis, seemed to assume that 
consideration of protected status in assigning an individual to a more broadly 
defined larger disfavored group is not overt disparate treatment. Justice 
Breyer’s decision for the five-member majority in Young11and Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion12 both seemed to agree with Justice Scalia’s 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Griggs, supra, at 431-432. 
6 The bona fide occupational qualification defense applies only to religion, sex and national origin 
discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
7 The disparate impact cause of action was codified at § 703(k) of Title VII by § 105 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k). This codification  provides that an “unlawful employment practice 
based on disparate impact is established under this title only if (i) a complaining party demonstrates that … 
a particular employment practice … causes a disparate impact … and the respondent fails to demonstrate 
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity; or (ii) the complaining party [demonstrates a satisfactory “alternative employment practice”] … 
that “the respondent refuses to adopt.”   
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(1). 
9 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
10 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
11 135 S. Ct. at 1343, discussed TAN 61-71 infra. 
12 Id. at 1356, discussed at note 81 infra. 
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opinion for the three dissenters13 that the light duty accommodation policy of 
United Parcel Service (UPS) for disabled drivers could not be treated as 
overt illegal disparate treatment against the protected category of pregnancy, 
even though UPS’s policy considered the pregnancy-based origins of Peggy 
Young’s lifting disability in assigning her disability to a larger residual 
category of disabilities that UPS did not favor with the accommodation of 
temporary light duty work.14  
 
 In Abercrombie, however, a conceptually identical case involving 
alleged religion-based rather than pregnancy-based discrimination, eight 
members of the Court held that consideration of a protected religious 
practice under a general policy that defined a larger group to be disfavored is 
illegal disparate treatment, absent the availability of a statutory defense.15 
These eight members concluded that disparate treatment analysis was 
appropriate for Abercrombie’s application of its neutral “Look Policy” 
against the wearing of “caps” to deny employment to Samantha Elauf, a 
young Muslim woman who wore a hijab scarf to her job interview, despite 
the fact that the neutral policy defined a larger disfavored group that 
included non-religious cap-wearers. Only Justice Thomas, in a separate 
opinion that argued that Abercrombie’s neutral policy could be challenged 
only for its disparate impact on certain religious practices,16 maintained 
consistency with the conceptual definition of disparate treatment apparently 
accepted by all members of the Court in Young. 
 
 In my view, the Court’s decision in Young was unfortunate. This is 
not only because the majority opinion, as I will explain below,17 diluted the 
Pregnancy Amendment Act (PDA)18 amendments to Title VII with a 
confusing opinion that provided incomplete guidance for future cases or 
even the Young case itself on remand. It is also because the opinion 
weakened the appropriate clarification that the Abercrombie decision might 
have given to the conceptual line between the disparate treatment and 
disparate impact forms of discrimination proscribed by Title VII. 
                                                 
13 Id. at 1361, discussed TAN 72-84 infra. 
14 UPS at least purported to accommodate only “(1) drivers who had become disabled on the job, (2) those 
who had lost their Department of Transportation (DOT) certifications, and (3) those who suffered from a 
disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).” 135 S. Ct. at 1344. 
15 135 S. Ct. at 2031 (majority opinion of Justice Scalia for seven Justices), 2034 (concurring opinion of 
Justice Alito). 
16 Id. at 2037. 
17 See TAN 61-71 infra. 




 In the remainder of this essay, I first explain why disparate treatment 
analysis is appropriate in cases where protected status is taken into account 
under a more general policy that defines a disfavored group that 
encompasses but is more inclusive than the protected status. I then use this 
explanation to defend the use of disparate treatment analysis in Abercrombie 
and to criticize the Justices for not applying it in Young. My criticism of the 
Young decision includes a further explanation of the sources of the Justices’ 
lack of perception, and enables me to conclude with a message of hope for a 





 It is illuminating to begin with the Court’s resolution of a conceptual 
distinction of disparate treatment from disparate impact that might be 
considered the converse of the issue at the core of Abercrombie and Young. 
The converse question is whether discrimination against a non-protected 
status category that is totally encompassed within but is not identical with a 
larger protected status category can be challenged as disparate treatment of 
the larger category’s protected status or rather must be challenged only for 
its disparate impact on the protected status. This was the conceptual question 
at the core of the pre-PDA challenge to the disability plan considered by the 
Court in General Electric Company v. Gilbert.19 The disability plan 
challenged in that case paid weekly sickness and accident benefits, but 
expressly excluded from the plan’s coverage disabilities arising from 
pregnancy. Since only women can become pregnant, all those disadvantaged 
were a subset of a Title VII protected status group. Justice Rehnquist’s 
decision for the Court, however, holds that since there was no finding that 
General Electric’s exclusion of pregnancy from its plan was based on 
consideration of the sex of those who might become pregnant, no finding 
that it was “a simple pretext for discrimination against women,”20 it could be 
challenged, if at all, only for a disparate impact on women.21 The plan’s 
exclusion of pregnancy was intentional discrimination against pregnancy, 
the defining status characteristic considered under the exclusion, but it was 
not intentional discrimination against women, the protected status that 
encompassed all those who were not provided benefits.    
                                                 
19 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
20 Id. at 136. 




 The Gilbert decision supported bad public policy and of course was 
soon reversed by the passage of the PDA. The Court’s pre-PDA resolution 
of the underlying conceptual question nonetheless made sense. Absent a 
factual finding that an employer took into account the protected category 
defining the larger set (women) when deciding to disfavor those in the 
subset (pregnancy), there is no basis for concluding that the adverse 
decisions were influenced by some consideration of the protected status of 
sex, rather than by other considerations, such as cost. Unlike in cases like 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta,22 condemning discrimination against a subset of 
all women, that basis cannot be provided in subset discrimination cases like 
Gilbert by locating comparators outside the protected status who share the 
characteristic defining the disfavored subset. In Martin Marietta, the 
employer hired some women, but not those with preschool aged children, 
while it did hire men with such children.23 The latter hiring proved that the 
employer was influenced in part by protected status in its disfavoring of the 
subset of women with young children. Such proof of course is not available 
in the rare case, like Gilbert, where the non-protected status, like pregnancy 
(pre-PDA), cannot be shared by those outside the protected status defining 
the larger set. 
 












Cases like Young and Abercrombie, where protected status defines the 
subset but not the set, are distinguishable from cases like Gilbert, where 
protected status defines the set but not the subset. In the former cases, there 
is no factual dispute over whether protected status – such as pregnancy or 
                                                 
22 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 






the religious practice of wearing head scarves -- has been considered by the 
employer when assigning individuals defined by such status to a larger set of 
disfavored individuals defined by unprotected categories. Moreover, as in 
cases like Martin Marietta, there are readily available comparators to 
confirm such consideration. There are many favored individuals outside the 
plaintiff’s protected status group who are in all potentially relevant respects 
identical to the plaintiff except for the protected status. 
 
 























Cases like Young and Abercrombie, where the employer assigns all 
those in a protected status (the pregnant; women wearing a hijab) to a larger 
disfavored group (those with disfavored disabilities; those who wear head 
covers) not defined by such status, also are distinguishable from 
paradigmatic disparate impact cases where protected status defines neither a 
set nor a subset of the disfavored and is not considered by the employer 












Co.24, the Supreme Court decision that first pronounced a Title VII disparate 
impact cause of action, the employer presumably applied high school 
education and aptitude test score requirements for employment without any 
consideration of the race-based status disproportionately affected by the 
neutral requirements. Or in Dothard v. Rawlinson,25 the Court’s first 
application of the disparate impact to sex discrimination, the employer 
presumably applied minimum height and weight requirements for prison-
guard employment without any consideration of the sex-based status 
disproportionately affected by the neutral requirements.  
 











What makes cases like Young and Abercrombie, where protected 
status defines the subset rather than the set, conceptually difficult is the fact 
that there also are otherwise identical individuals – other comparators  -- 
outside the plaintiff’s protected subset, but within the larger set, who are 
disfavored. Ultimately, however, the unfavorable treatment of these other 
comparators should not insulate such cases from disparate treatment 
analysis. The statutory language in § 703(a)(1) of Title VII on which the 
disparate treatment cause of action is based makes it “an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer … to discriminate against any 
individual … because of such individual’s” protected status.26 Such 
proscribed discrimination can occur where individuals in the plaintiff’s 
protected class are not the only disfavored individuals; disparate treatment 
analysis only must determine whether the plaintiff’s protected status made a 
difference in his treatment. Consider, for example, a national origin 
discrimination case brought by a Croatian-American against a Serbian-
American owned business that the Croatian claimed discriminated against 
                                                 
24 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
25 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 















her because of her ethnic background. If the Croatian could present favored 
Serbian-American comparators, she could establish disparate treatment on 
the basis of national origin, regardless of whether the employer could 
present equally disfavored Slovenian-American or Bosnian-American 

















This Balkanized hypothetical admittedly does not fully capture the 
discrimination in the Young and Abercrombie cases because in my 
hypothetical the employer seems to be disfavoring the Croatian not under a 
legal neutral policy, but rather under a general policy of discrimination 
against anyone of at least Southeastern European, non-Serbian descent, a 
general policy defining the larger set that is itself as illegal a form of 
national origin discrimination as is any more particularized form of 
discrimination against the plaintiff’s subset of Croatian-Americans. Indeed, 
it generally will be true that other disfavored comparators outside the 
plaintiff’s protected class-defined subset but within a larger encompassing 
set, also will have a similar cause of action to that of the plaintiff for any 
form of status discrimination subject to universalistic and symmetrical 
prohibitions. Such prohibitions, such as those against race, non-pregnancy 
sex, national origin, and forms of religious discrimination in Title VII, can 
be invoked in the same manner by all and cut equally in all directions.27 For 
such prohibitions, it is difficult to imagine realistic cases where larger sets of 
disfavored workers include comparators who do not have similar causes of 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (holding that whites employees 








action to those encompassed within the illegally defined subsets of 
workers.28  
 
As further explained below, the prohibition of pregnancy 
discrimination embodied within Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination 
and the prohibition of the type of religious discrimination at issue in 
Abercrombie, however, are both more like the non-universalistic and 
asymmetrical prohibitions of age and disability discrimination contained in 
the ADEA and the ADA respectively. The prohibition of age discrimination 
in the ADEA is non-universalistic and asymmetrical because the statute 
protects only those forty and older and does so only against age 
discrimination that favors younger workers.29 The prohibition of disability 
discrimination by the ADA is non-universalistic and asymmetrical because it 
protects only the limited class of disabled workers and does not protect the 
non-disabled from any discrimination in favor of the disabled.  
 
The ADEA and the ADA thus may present more realistic testing 
hypotheticals closer to the facts of Young and Abercrombie. Consider a 
policy against hiring workers older than age 30. Under such a policy the 
larger disfavored class would include comparators between the ages of 30 
and 40 who would not have a cause of action for age discrimination like the 
protected subset of disfavored workers over the age of 40. Presumably, this 
latter subset of workers should and would be able to claim overt disparate 
treatment on the basis of age despite being included by the employer’s 
                                                 
28 But not difficult for a law professor to imagine unrealistic hypotheticals, like the employer who sincerely 
hates very curly hair and therefore refuses under this neutral principle to hire anyone that he knows is of 
African descent regardless of the current length or style of their hair. Even if the neutral principle is not a 
pretext for the disfavoring of blacks (which of course it realistically would be), the employer’s policy 
presumably would and should be treated as overt disparate treatment on the basis of race because the 
disfavored status-protected subset of blacks is included within the larger disfavored set that is defined by a 
unprotected status, very curly hair.  
29 See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (limiting protections “to individuals who are at least 40 years of age”); General 
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004 (holding the ADEA does not prohibit favoring 
older workers over younger workers). 
 It is conceptually possible to have a discrimination prohibition that is non-universalistic, but 
symmetric. This was how the dissenters in Cline, for instance, interpreted the ADEA. See id. at 602 (Justice 
Thomas, dissenting); id. at 601 (Justice Scalia, dissenting). Such a prohibition, however, cannot function 
consistently in practice. If the dissenters’ view of the ADEA was correct – if the Act prohibited 
discrimination against the younger as well as against the older – then an employer could not favor older 
workers in the 40 and over protected class, but only workers in this protected class could object. Thus, an 
employer with impunity could have a policy of hiring only those 40 and over because the policy disfavored 
no workers in the protected class, but the employer could not have a policy of hiring only those 50 and over 
because such a policy would disfavor protected workers between their 40th and 50th birthdays. 
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policy within a larger set of workers that includes many who could not claim 
such discrimination.30 
 











It might be argued that the larger set in the last hypothetical is itself 
defined by an age-based policy unfavorable to older workers, even if it 
includes some comparators with no cause of action. But consider a 
hypothetical based on the current ADA. Assume an employer has a policy 
against employing permanent workers whose body mass index (BMI) is 
above a particular level and that the employer consequently does not hire 
anyone who it deems unable to reach this BMI within six months. The 
employer thus rejects any applicant for employment whom it knows to be 
obese because of a difficult-to-control physiological condition. Assuming, as 
                                                 
30 Indeed, the opinions in an ADEA case decided by the Court in 2008, Kentucky Retirement  
Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135 (2008), suggest that the current Justices would recognize as ADEA-
proscribed disparate treatment the age-based assignment of older workers to a less favorable status under a 
broader neutrally, defined policy. In this case, the Court considered a challenge to Kentucky’s disability 
retirement plan, based on the plan’s treatment of some “disabled individuals more generously than it treats 
some of those who become disabled only after becoming eligible for retirement” and their normal pension, 
an eligibility that depended in part on age. Id. at 138. Justice Kennedy, in a dissent for three other Justices 
(Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito) also currently on the Court, id. at 150, argued that the Kentucky system was 
“a straightforward act of discrimination on the basis of age,” id. at 152, even though he did not question 
Kentucky’s good faith attempt to align a disabled worker’s pension with the pension he would have earned 
had he worked until retirement age without a disability. Justice Kennedy did not find relevant Kentucky’s 
use of the neutral broader principle of pension eligibility, finding the case no different than one where “an 
employer divided his employees into two teams based upon age -- putting all workers over the age of 65 on 
“Team A” and all other workers on “Team B” – and then paid Team B members twice the salary of their 
Team A counterparts.” Id. at 158. 
    The other five Justices joined in an opinion by Justice Breyer, id. at 137,  that upheld the Kentucky plan 
based primarily on the ADEA’s special treatment of pensions, but cautioned “that our opinion in no way 
unsettles the rule that a statute or policy that facially discriminates based on age suffices to show disparate 
treatment under the ADEA. We are dealing today with the quite special case of differential treatment based 
on pension status, where pension status – with the explicit blessing of the ADEA itself turns, in part, on 
age.” Id. at 147-148. 
Workers 30 and Over




courts have held,31 that such physiologically based obesity is a disability 
protected from discrimination by the ADA, but that being overweight or 
even obese generally is not,32 the employer’s assignment of the protected 
subset of the physiologically obese to its excluded neutrally defined set of 
unacceptably overweight workers should and, I think, would be treated as 















It is difficult to distinguish this ADA hypothetical conceptually from 
either Young or Abercrombie. In each case, the employer is culpable of 
considering a category protected from discrimination as the basis for 
assigning workers to a larger set of disfavored workers defined by principles 
that are neutral under the antidiscrimination laws. In each case those neutral 
principles not only advantage comparators outside the protected subset, but 
also disadvantage comparators who are within the larger set, but not the 
protected subset. Each case should be treated alike and that treatment should 
be as overt disparate treatment on the basis of the category defining the 
protected subset of workers.  
 
An explanation of why the Court nonetheless did not afford Peggy 
Young as a member of a protected subset of pregnant workers the benefit of 
overt disparate treatment protection can best follow an analysis of why the 
Court inconsistently did afford this benefit to Samantha Elauf, the hijab-
wearing Muslim woman, in Abercrombie. 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Cook v. State of Rhode Island Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17 
(1st Cir. 1992) (finding an impairment because obese woman demonstrated her obesity was caused by a 
physiological condition).  












 The issue presented and directly decided by the Court in Abercrombie 
was not the conceptual distinction of disparate treatment discrimination that 
I am treating in this essay. The Court instead granted certiorari in 
Abercrombie to resolve a split in the Courts of Appeals on whether an 
employer’s duty under Title VII to not treat adversely an employee or 
applicant for employment because of her religious practice applies only 
when the employee or applicant has informed the employer that the practice 
is religion-based and thus might require some accommodation.33 Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for a seven Justice majority holds that the employer’s duty 
is not so conditioned, that an employee or applicant can “show disparate 
treatment without first showing that an employer has “actual knowledge” of 
the applicant’s need for an accommodation.”34 It is sufficient for a plaintiff 
to demonstrate that the employer was motivated by its agent’s consideration 
of the plaintiff’s religious practice, whether or not it knew that the practice 
actually was based on religion. Justice Scalia founded the holding primarily 
on the wording of the statutory provision that expresses Title VII’s 
prohibition of disparate treatment discrimination on the basis of religion, or 
of race, color, sex, and national origin. That provision, § 703(a)(1) of the 
Act, Justice Scalia stressed, requires only that the plaintiff prove that a 
discriminatory motive caused the adverse employment decision, such as the 
failure to hire, about which the plaintiff complains.35 The provision does not 
include any kind of knowledge requirement.  
 
 This interpretation of § 703(a)(1) has little import for most status 
discrimination cases. An employer cannot be motivated to treat an employee 
or applicant adversely on the basis of some protected status, such as race or 
sex, of which it is not aware. The same is true for the status of religious 
affiliation or belief. However, Title VII defines the status category of 
religion to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well 
as belief,”36 and employers may treat employees or applicants differently 
because of some practice, such as the wearing of particular clothing, without 
                                                 
33 Compare Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993), with EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013). 
34 135 S. Ct. at 2032. 
35 Id. at 2032-2033. 
36 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j). 
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being told or knowing for certain the reason for the practice. So for cases 
like Abercrombie that involve alleged discrimination against a religious 
practice, the holding is important. 
 
 It probably does not mean, however, that an employer can be liable 
for discrimination against a religious practice without the plaintiff showing 
that the employer had some reason at least to be suspicious that the practice 
might be religion-based. As Justice Alito argued in his concurring opinion, 
there certainly was such a showing in this case.37 The record indicated that 
the Abercrombie employee who interviewed Samantha Elauf thought she 
wore a scarf to the interview for religious reasons,38 and this belief was 
communicated to the district manager who told the interviewer to not hire 
her.39 Without an employer’s agents having some reason to think a practice 
might have a religious basis, it is hard to discern a motive to treat religion 
adversely. As Justice Alito argued, there would not be “any blameworthy 
conduct.”40 It thus was not surprising that Justice Scalia in a footnote 
allowed, while declining to resolve “by way of dictum,” that “it is arguable 
that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least 
suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice.”41 
 
 The need for some level of suspicion of a religious basis for the 
disfavored practice on which to base the employer’s culpability seems 
particularly important because, as noted, Justice Scalia expressly treated 
Abercrombie’s rejection of Elauf as “disparate-treatment” rather than 
disparate impact discrimination under the statutory provision on which 
disparate treatment analysis is based. Indeed, the Court could not have used 
disparate impact theory to review the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn 
a jury award of damages based on disparate treatment.   
 
 Justice Thomas was the only member of the Court to dissent from 
Justice Scalia’s acceptance of disparate treatment analysis in the case. To 
Justice Thomas, it was “a classic case of an alleged disparate impact” 
because Abercrombie “did not treat religious practices less favorably than 
similar secular practices.”42 Justice Thomas did not need to know whether 
Abercrombie had any suspicion of whether Elauf had a religious motivation 
                                                 
37 135 S.Ct. at 2034. 
38 Id. at 2031. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 2036. 
41 Id. at 2033, n.3 
42 Id. at 2037, 2038. 
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before applying its Look Policy to her because Abercrombie would have 
applied the same policy to secular comparators. Justice Thomas failed to 
perceive any difference between a case, like Abercrombie, where an 
employer considers a protected status as a basis for assigning an employee to 
a larger set of disfavored workers, and a paradigmatic disparate impact case, 
like Griggs, where an employer’s challenged practice merely has a 
disproportionate effect on a protected group without any direct consideration 
of protected status. 
 
 Justice Scalia included two responses to Justice Thomas in his 
majority opinion. The second of these responses was not alone persuasive, as 
it did no more than note that Title VII’s protection of religious “practice” is 
asymmetrical and not universalistic. Thus, Justice Scalia’s assertion that 
Title VII “does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious 
practices,” but rather “gives them favored treatment”43 not given to religious 
practices, merely explained why Title VII’s protection against religious 
discrimination, like the ADA and the ADEA prohibitions discussed above, is 
more likely to pose the conceptual problem that is the subject of this essay; it 
did not explain why it should be answered differently than does Justice 
Thomas.  
 
 Justice Scalia includes in this second response an assertion that “Title 
VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an 
accommodation.”44 But the accommodation requirement is not relevant to 
the question of whether differential treatment of someone because they 
engaged in a practice that turns out to be religious is Title VII disparate 
treatment when that same treatment would be given to the practice if it were 
secular. The provision upon which Title VII disparate treatment is based, § 
703(a)(1), treats discrimination on the basis of religion the same as the 
prohibition of the other prohibited forms of discrimination and it contains no 
reference to accommodation. The only mention of accommodation is in the 
affirmative defense provided to employers in the definition of religion to 
include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably 
accommodate … without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.”45 The accommodation-undue hardship defense thus is only 
relevant to determining what is protected as religion under Title VII’s 
                                                 
43 Id. at 2034. 
44 Id. 
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
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disparate treatment provision; it does not define the conceptual scope of 
disparate treatment. 
  
Justice Scalia’s first response to Justice Thomas, however, seems a 
more direct rejection of Justice Thomas’s answer to the underlying 
conceptual question. Justice Scalia states that Justice Thomas might be 
correct “if Congress had limited the meaning of “religion” in Title VII to 
religious belief --- so that discriminating against a particular religious 
practice would not be disparate treatment though it might have disparate 
impact.”46 But since “religious practice is one of [Title VII’s] protected 
characteristics,”47 differential treatment of someone engaged in the practice 
can constitute disparate treatment, regardless of whether that differential 
treatment is consistent with more general policies.   
 
In his response to Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion, Justice 
Alito takes the same position more directly.48 In order to prove 
discrimination under Title VII’s disparate treatment provision, asserts Justice 
Alito, a “plaintiff need not show … that the employer took the adverse 
action because of the religious nature of the practice. … Suppose, for 
example, that an employer rejected all applicants who refuse to work on 
Saturday, whether for religious or nonreligious reasons. Applicants whose 
refusal to work on Saturday was known by the employer to be based on 
religion will have been rejected because of a religious practice.”49 Justice 
Alito then supports this conclusion by noting that there would be no need to 
provide the reasonable accommodation-undue hardship “defense” in the 
definition of religion if the disparate treatment provision – the provision 
covering all forms of Title VII discrimination – did not have this meaning.50 
 
Thus, had it stood alone in the 2014-2015 Term of the Court, EEOC v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores would have provided strong support for a 
conceptual definition of Title VII disparate treatment to include assigning 
members of a protected status group to a larger disfavored group that 
includes others who are not members of the protected group. Abercrombie 
did this by assigning Muslim women engaging in a religious practice to the 
larger disfavored group of “cap” wearers. But Abercrombie did not stand 
                                                 
46 135 S. Ct. at 2033. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 2037. 




alone as a case relevant to the conceptual definition. Two months before 
Abercrombie, in Young v. UPS, the Court had seemed to assume a different 
conceptual definition of Title VII disparate treatment in a case involving the 





 The PDA added a definition of sex, right after the definition of 
religion, in the definitional section of Title VII. The first clause of this 
definition states that ““because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but 
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.”51 By folding pregnancy discrimination into the 
category of sex, this clause effectively expanded from five to six the 
categories covered by Title VII’s prohibitions of discrimination, including 
the employer disparate treatment prohibition, § 703(a)(1).52 Had a majority 
of the Justices in Young interpreted the latter prohibition in the same manner 
that they interpreted it two months later in Abercrombie, the answer to the 
conceptual question posed in this essay would be clear.  
 
 UPS required Young, a part-time driver, to stay home without pay, 
causing an eventual loss of medical coverage, during most of her pregnancy 
when she could not lift the minimum weight that UPS required its drivers to 
be able to lift. UPS denied Young’s request to be accommodated with help 
on the lifting of heavy packages. It based its denial on the cause of Young’s 
lifting restriction, her pregnancy, deciding that this cause did not fit any of 
the three categories of disability causes that it accommodated under its 
general personnel policy. Under that policy, UPS accommodated (1) drivers 
who had become disabled on the job, (2) those who had lost their 
Department of Transportation (DOT) certification as drivers, and (3) those 
who suffered from a disability covered by the ADA.53 Young’s pregnancy 
disabled her off the job, did not cause her to lose her DOT certification as a 
driver, and was not covered as a disability at that time under the ADA 
because it was only temporary. Thus, UPS considered Young’s protected 
status of pregnancy in placing her in a larger set of neutrally defined 
disfavored workers, just as Abercrombie considered Elauf’s religious head 
scarf in placing her in a larger set of neutrally defined disfavored workers. 
                                                 
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 




 In both cases, of course, there were other members of the disfavored 
set – secular cap-wearers in Abercrombie; workers with other off-the-job 
caused lifting restrictions in Young – who were not provided 
accommodations under neutral company policy. These other disfavored 
workers would continue to be disadvantaged even if discrimination against 
the religious and the pregnant were eliminated. This was not a problem in 
Abercrombie because, as noted above,54 Title VII’s prohibition of 
discrimination against religious practice is both non-universalistic and 
asymmetrical; Title VII does not protect secular practices and it does not 
prohibit accommodations favoring religious practices over secular practices. 
It need not have been a problem in Young either, however, because the Court 
already had held that the PDA’s prohibition of pregnancy discrimination 
also is both non-universalistic and asymmetrical; the PDA does not protect 
other conditions or disabilities and it does not prohibit employers from 
favoring pregnancy.  
 
 The Court rendered this holding in California Federal Savings and 
Loan Association v. Guerra,55 a decision that could have guided the decision 
in Young, but was not part of the central analysis of any opinion in the case. 
Guerra involved a preemption challenge to a California law that required 
employers to provide female employees an unpaid pregnancy disability 
leave of up to four months,56 but did not require the provision of such leave 
to workers disabled for other reasons. The plaintiff employer argued that this 
California law conflicted with the federal PDA because the state law allowed 
employers to provide a type of preferential treatment for pregnancy that the 
employer construed the PDA to prohibit. The Court rejected the preemption 
challenge in part57 because it rejected the employer’s construction of the 
PDA to prohibit preferential treatment of pregnancy. Rather, the Court 
agreed “with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Congress intended the 
PDA to be a “floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not 
drop --- not a ceiling above which they may not rise.””58 An employer who 
                                                 
54 See TAN 43. 
55 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
56 Id. at 275-276. 
57 The Court also stated that even if the PDA prohibited preferential treatment of pregnancy, the PDA 
would not preempt the California law under the narrow conflict-based preemption provision in Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-7, because employers could comply with both the federal and state law by providing the 
four month disability leave for all disabilities. 479 U.S. at 290-291.  
58 Id. at 275-276. For an argument that Guerra’s interpretation of the PDA as asymmetric should be limited 
to pregnancy disability cases like Guerra and Young, see Noah Zatz, Special Treatment Everywhere, 
Special Treatment Nowhere, 95 B. U. L. Rev. 1155, 1176-1177 (2015). 
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complied with the California law thus would not be in violation of the PDA 
if it did not provide comparable benefits to other disabilities.  
 
 The same would be true for UPS had it treated pregnancy restrictions 
as well as the three categories of restrictions favored by its policies. It would 
not have illegally discriminated against any others whose restrictions were 
disfavored for reasons other than their being pregnancy-based. It would not 
have violated the non-universalistic and asymmetrical PDA by 
accommodating Young any more than Abercrombie would have violated the 
non-universalistic and asymmetrical Title VII prohibition of discrimination 
against religious practices had it accommodated Elauf. 
 
 Nonetheless, none of the opinions in Young used Guerra as guiding 
precedent to decide the case under the first clause of the PDA. Each opinion 
assumed, perhaps encouraged by a surprising concession from Young’s 
attorney, that Young would lose her case if she had only the first clause on 
which to rely.59 Each assumed that the case instead turned primarily on the 
meaning of a second clause that states “and women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all 
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability 
or inability to work.”60 This second clause does not modify disparate 
treatment principles, but simply clarifies that these principles apply in cases 
where pregnancy affects or is regarded as affecting the ability to work.61 It 
was in the opinions’ interpretation of this clause that all of the Justices 
seemed to accept a different conceptual definition of intentional 
discrimination than that assumed by eight Justices in Abercrombie. 
 
 Justice Breyer’s opinion for the majority in Young expressly rejects an 
interpretation of the second clause offered by Young that would have 
interpreted the PDA consistently with the interpretation that the Court in 
Abercrombie seemed to give to Title VII’s general disparate treatment 
prohibition in § 703(a)(1). Justice Breyer’s opinion rejects Young’s 
contention “that the second clause means that whenever “an employer 
accommodates only a subset of workers with disabling conditions,” a court 
                                                 
59 Petitioner’s Brief at 22-24. 
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
61 The clause also clarifies that the appropriate comparators for determining disparate treatment are non-
pregnant persons “similar in their ability to work” – in other words, those whose similar ability or inability 
to work have causes other than pregnancy.  
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should find a Title VII violation if “pregnant workers who are similar in the 
ability to work” do not “receive the same [accommodation] even if still other 
non-pregnant workers do not receive accommodations.”62 This rejected 
interpretation is conceptually the same as the Court’s assumption in 
Abercrombie about the meaning of the disparate treatment prohibition of 
discrimination against religious practices. 
 
 Justice Breyer oddly rejects this interpretation because it would grant 
the pregnant a “most-favored-nation” status.63 But granting a most-favored- 
nation status to a protected group is what all anti-discrimination law does in 
effect. My hypothetical Croatian-American who is rejected by a Serbian-
American employer wants to claim Croatia as equal to the favored Serbian 
nation. The Croatian’s national origin discrimination claim is not different 
from Young’s pregnancy discrimination claim except for the fact that those 
of all other national origins also can claim “most-favored-nation” status 
because the prohibition of national origin discrimination in Title VII, unlike 
the prohibition of pregnancy discrimination, has a universalistic sweep.  
 
 Justice Breyer claims that the second clause cannot grant a “most-
favored-nation” status because it would mean that an employer could not 
grant greater accommodations to some workers because of “the nature of 
their jobs, the employer’s need to keep them working, their ages, or any 
other criteria .…If Congress intended to allow differences in treatment 
arising out of special duties, special service, or special needs, why would it 
not also have wanted courts to take account of differences arising out of 
special causes…?”64 Justice Breyer’s claim is baffling because the answer to 
his question is obvious: Congress, by requiring employers to treat the 
pregnant as well as comparators whose work limitations had other causes, 
prohibited discrimination against a particular cause of an inability to work, 
pregnancy, and in favor of other such causes;65 it did not prohibit 
discrimination favoring those who performed particular jobs, or favoring 
those who are particularly valuable to an employer, or favoring those who 
are older. Presumably, Justice Breyer and other members of the Court would 
have no difficulty granting the Croatian-American “most-favored-nation” 
status in a case where he challenged a Serbian receiving twice the Croatian’s 
pay for the same work, even though the Croatian could not claim 
                                                 
62 135 S. Ct. at 1349. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1350. 
65 See note 61 and TAN 60-61 supra. 
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discrimination if the Serbian’s better treatment was because of his “special 
duties, special service, or special needs.”66  
 
 One might surmise that the Court’s restriction of the reach of 
disparate treatment analysis in pregnancy discrimination cases derived from 
some uncertainty about the purpose of the second clause of the PDA. Yet, 
Justice Breyer indicated that Young’s disparate treatment case must rely on 
this second clause to expand her protection, that it is not enough for the PDA 
to have included pregnancy as a protected status, because “disparate-
treatment law normally permits an employer” to do what UPS did to Young: 
“implement policies that are not intended to harm members of a protected 
class, even if their implementation sometimes harms those members, as long 
as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason 
for doing so.”67 Moreover, Justice Breyer’s opinion asserts that the second 
clause is necessary to fulfill Congress’ intent to overrule Gilbert because in 
that case General Electric had a neutral policy defining a disfavored subset 
of disabilities -- those not derived from accidents or illnesses -- that at least 
might include others than those included within the protected status of the 
pregnant. Thus, the majority opinion in Young seems to assume that Title 
VII’s general prohibition of disparate treatment does not encompass 
consideration of protected status in the assignment of employees to a 
neutrally defined larger set of disfavored employees.  
 
 Justice Breyer’s consequent interpretation of the second clause of the 
PDA in order to ensure the overruling of Gilbert will be hard for lower court 
judges to understand. On the one hand, Justice Breyer’s opinion seems to do 
no more than explain how an employer’s intent to treat pregnancy worse 
than other similar causes of a disability could be uncovered through use of 
the framework first set forth by the Court for § 703(a)(1) cases in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green68 to uncover covert discriminatory intent through 
proof that an ostensibly neutral reason is a pretextual cover for proscribed 
intentional discrimination. If this is all Justice Breyer means, however, the 
opinion ultimately adopts a reading of the second clause of the PDA that 
does not after all expand on the narrowly interpreted first clause, but rather 
                                                 
66 The Court’s apparent inability to treat pregnancy discrimination like other forms of Title VII-prohibited 
discrimination mirrored the difficulty the lower courts have had implementing the PDA. See, for instance, 
the analyses of lower court decisions in Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, 21 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 67, 87-93 (2013), and Joanna L. 
Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 Geo. L.J. 567, 614-15 (2010).   
67 Id. 
68 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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simply confirms the first clause’s directive that pregnancy be added to the 
five original protected status categories.  
 
On the other hand, Justice Breyer’s opinion might be read to merge 
the balancing of disparate impact analysis into the McDonnell Douglas 
framework to make proof of pretext easier in pregnancy discrimination cases 
than in other disparate treatment cases. The opinion even rejects, at least 
“normally,” as “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons,”69 the quite credible 
rationales of expense and convenience.70 Then, borrowing a justification-
based balancing analysis from disparate impact law, the opinion states that a 
“plaintiff may reach a jury” on the issue of pretext “by providing sufficient 
evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on 
pregnant workers, and the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” 
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather – when 
considered along with the burden imposed – give rise to an inference of 
intentional discrimination.”71 An interpretation of the second clause of the 
PDA to make proof of pretext easier than in other § 703(a)(1) cases, 
however, has absolutely no support in the language of that clause, and is a 
policy-based compromise more appropriate for Congress than for the Court. 
As part of the compromise, it also provides an unclear direction to lower 
courts to treat differently, and unpredictably, pregnancy discrimination cases 
depending on the number of other workers accommodated and the reasons 
for such accommodations. 
 
 Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia has a great deal of fun in his dissent 
ridiculing Justice Breyer’s creative, but vulnerable opinion, especially the 
apparent merging of disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis.  
Justice Scalia is not easily fooled by sleights of hand. He fully understands 
that any reading of the second clause of the PDA to merge disparate impact 
balancing analysis into the McDonnel Douglas framework finds no support 
in the language of that clause and that without such a reading, Breyer’s 
opinion has “just marched up and down the hill” claiming the second clause 
is not redundant and superfluous: “If the clause merely instructed courts to 
consider a policy’s effects and justifications the way it considers other 
circumstantial evidence of motive, it would be superfluous. So the Court’s 
balancing test must mean something else. Even if the effects and 
justifications of policies are not enough to show intent to discriminate under 
                                                 





ordinary Title VII principles, they could (Poof!) still show intent to 
discriminate for purpose of the pregnancy same-treatment clause. 
Deliciously incoherent.”72 
 
 Justice Scalia, however, has his fun only after choosing an 
interpretation of the second clause that rejects the broader conceptual 
definition of disparate treatment covered by § 703(a)(1) that he embraced 
two months later for religious discrimination in Abercrombie. Justice Scalia 
correctly asserts that the second clause of the PDA has “two conceivable 
readings.”73 But he goes astray in not seeing that the first “most natural way 
to understand the same-treatment clause”74 encompasses both of those 
readings, and that his second reading is only a straw man. The second 
reading, advanced neither by Young nor the government, is that pregnant 
women must be given the “the same accommodations as others, no matter 
the differences (other than pregnancy) between them.”75 Justice Scalia easily 
burns the straw man in the same confused manner that Justice Breyer claims 
to dismiss a most-favored-nation interpretation of the PDA.76 “Prohibiting 
employers from making any distinctions between pregnant workers and 
others of similar ability” would mean if a company “offered chauffeurs to 
injured directors, it would have to offer chauffeurs to pregnant mechanics” 
and if it “paid pensions to workers who can no longer work because of old 
age, it would have to pay pensions to workers who can no longer work 
because of childbirth.”77 
 
 Having thus charred what no one argued, Justice Scalia thereby 
reasonably concludes that the “same-treatment,” second clause of the PDA 
must condemn only distinguishing “between pregnant women and others of 
similar ability because of pregnancy.”78 But Justice Scalia seems blind to 
what he perceived in Abercrombie, that the same because of language in § 
703(a)(1) can encompass consideration of a protected status under a more 
general neutral policy, as well as consideration of a protected status without 
                                                 
72 Id. at 1365. 
73 Id. at 1361. 
74 Id. at 1362 
75 Id. 
76 See TAN 63-66. 
77 135 S.Ct. at 1362. A corporate director and a mechanic are of course not “similar in their ability to 
work,” regardless of the cause of either’s disability. More generally, an employer can pay a white male 
corporate officer better than a black female mechanic without raising any suspicion of race or sex 
discrimination. Justice Scalia’s pension example is equally misleading. Pension eligibility can be based on 




reference to such a policy. Thus, perhaps in part because the majority failed 
to advance the more expansive definition of intentional discrimination 
Justice Scalia later embraced in Abercrombie, he asserts that the only 
reasonable interpretation of the PDA requires a rejection of Young’s 
disparate treatment case.  
 
 Apart from its inconsistency with his Abercrombie opinion, Justice 
Scalia’s narrow reading of the PDA is even more troubling than Justice 
Breyer’s incoherent reading. This narrow reading forced Justice Scalia to 
interpret the Congressional intent to overturn Gilbert to be limited to 
ensuring a favorable result in the easier case the Gilbert dissenters described 
to argue their pre-PDA case for sex discrimination: where an employer 
“singled out” only pregnancy-related conditions for exclusion from some 
disability benefit.79 Justice Scalia thereby adopts what is in effect a “least-
favored-nation” interpretation of the PDA. An employer engages in 
actionable pregnancy discrimination only when it treats pregnancy-related 
disabilities less favorably than all, or perhaps in pretext analysis almost all, 
other disabilities.  
 
 Justice Scalia’s “least-favored-nation” reading of the PDA, like 
Justice Breyer’s rejection of a “most-favored-nation” reading, was not 
consistent with the Court’s earlier decision in Guerra. Because it held that 
the PDA sets a floor, but not a ceiling, for pregnancy benefits,80 Guerra 
should have settled how the PDA treats a case like Young in which an 
employer has to choose between assigning pregnancy disabilities to a larger 
set of favored disabilities or a larger set of disfavored disabilities. Because 
Guerra interpreted the PDA to be asymmetrical as well as non-
universalistic, it required employers to treat pregnancy-based disabilities as 
well as it treats any disabilities deriving from any other causes, regardless of 
whether that results in the relative disfavoring of other non-protected 
disabilities.81 
                                                 
79 Id. at 1364. 
80 See TAN 55-58 supra. 
81 A failure to appreciate the implications of the Guerra decision also led Justice Alito in his concurring 
opinion in Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1356, to adopt a forced interpretation of the second clause of the PDA. 
Justice Alito asserts that the clause cannot mean that pregnant women must be treated as other employees 
similar in their ability or inability to work because in cases like Young not all other such employees are 
treated the same; some are favored with accommodation and some are not. Id. at 1358. Justice Alito 
therefore asserts it is necessary to insert an additional two words in the clause, “similar in relation to the 
ability or inability to work,” and that these two words somehow justify his conclusion that the clause allows 
employers to discriminate against pregnant women and in favor of others “unable to work for different 
reasons” as long as it has some “neutral business reason for treating them differently” other than concern 
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It is indeed possible that the Court’s use of a different conceptual 
definition of disparate treatment in Young from that embraced two months 
later in Abercrombie derived in part from the unwillingness of a majority of 
the Justices to reaffirm Guerra’s interpretation of the PDA82. Absent the 
reaffirmation of Guerra’s holding that the PDA is symmetrical, Young posed 
a more difficult case; if -- contrary to the Guerra decision – the PDA 
prohibits discrimination in favor of pregnancy symmetrically with its 
prohibition of discrimination against pregnancy, then granting pregnancy 
“most-favored-nation” status would require employers to treat all conditions 
equally well, regardless of cause. This is because pregnancy would have to 
be treated as well as a favored condition and a disfavored condition would 
have to be treated as well as pregnancy. This might have seemed to the 
Justices excessively restrictive of employer discretion because the PDA 
certainly does not universally prohibit discrimination between other types of 
disabilities, as Title VII universally prohibits all forms of race or national 
origin or color discrimination.  
 
The Court easily could have avoided a more burdensome restriction 
on employers, however, without its inconsistent conceptual framing of the 
disparate treatment cause of action, by reaffirming Guerra’s holding that the 
PDA was intended to be asymmetrical as well as fully non-universalistic.83 It 
is hard to imagine why Congress would want employees with other 
conditions to have a cause of action against more favorable treatment of 
pregnancy when they would not have a cause of action against more 
favorable treatment of other conditions. Not surprisingly, there are no other 
                                                 
with expense or convenience. Id. at 1359. The best characterization of Justice Alito’s reasoning requires 
borrowing a word from Justice Scalia: Poof! 
82 Some might speculate that Justice Ginsburg in particular was not comfortable with the favoring of 
pregnancy after her pre-judicial career of Supreme Court advocacy against laws that stigmatized women. 
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding a provision of the Social Security Act 
unconstitutional because it provided special benefits to widows but not widowers caring for minor 
children); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional requiring husbands of 
servicewomen but not wives of servicemen to present proof of financial qualifications); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 359, 377 (noting – without 
taking sides – how Guerra divided the feminist community) (2009); Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: 
The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act the American with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 961, 998-1001 (recounting the opposition of some feminists to an asymmetric interpretation of the 
PDA).    
83 Doing so, as the Court explained in Guerra, see 479 U.S. at 291, and Justice Ginsburg could have 
understood, would not have stigmatized women in any way. As the Guerra Court recognized, Congress 
intended that women, who generally face the same range of other burdens as do men, not be disadvantaged 
by the special burden of pregnancy. See Widiss, supra, at 995-998 (discussing legislative history). 
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 Notwithstanding the failure of any opinion in Young85 to provide an 
adequate interpretation of the PDA, there remains reason for hope that the 
conceptual problem presented by Young and Abercrombie, and addressed in 
this essay, will be resolved by the Court in the future with a more expansive 
and appropriate scope for disparate treatment analysis. In the first place, 
Abercrombie was decided after Young and was a more direct interpretation of 
the meaning of § 703(a)(1), the provision on which the disparate treatment 
cause of action is based. The Justices in Abercrombie, unlike in Young, were 
not distracted by the need to interpret an ambiguous secondary clause in an 
amendment to Title VII or by specious arguments about most favored nations. 
Perhaps the very incoherence and unpredictable meaning of Justice Breyer’s 
majority in Young may make it more likely that the Court will have to decide 
another PDA case86 in which advocates for a more expansive interpretation of 
the statute will get a second chance to argue for a broader definition of 
disparate treatment in line with the Abercrombie Court’s treatment of the 
religious discrimination proscribed by Title VII.87 
                                                 
84 Cf. Note 29 supra. 
85 In addition to the majority opinion, Justice Scalia’s dissent, and Justice Alito’s concurrence, the only 
other opinion was a short statement from Justice Kennedy. 135 S.Ct. at 1366. This statement expressed 
sympathy with “societal concern” “that women who are in the work force --- by choice, by financial 
necessity, or both – confront a serious disadvantage after becoming pregnant,” id. at 1367, but joined 
Justice Scalia’s opinion interpreting  the PDA in a manner that effectively failed to address this concern.  
86 Legislation was introduced in 2015 in the Senate, S.1512, 114th Cong., 1st Sess., and House, H.R. 2654, 
114th Cong., 1st Sess.,to require all employers covered by Title VII to make it illegal to: (1) fail to make 
reasonable accommodations to known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions of job applicants or employees, unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on 
such an entity’s business operation; (2) deny employment opportunities based on the need to make such 
reasonable accommodations; (3) require such job applicants or employees to accept an accommodation that 
they choose not to accept, if such accommodation is unnecessary to perform the job; (4) require such 
employees to take paid or unpaid leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided to their 
known limitations; or (5) take adverse action in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment against an 
employee requesting or using such reasonable accommodations. The prospects for legislation of this sort 
are not great, however, absent a significant change in the composition of Congress. 
87 Justice Breyer suggested that amendments to the ADA “made after the time of Young’s pregnancy may 
limit the future significance” of the Court’s interpretation of the PDA because those amendments require 
employers to accommodate disabilities defined by limitations on a broad set of life activities, including 
lifting, standing, and bending, even if the limitations are temporary, as they normally would be if caused by 
pregnancy. Id. at 1348. The amended ADA, however, even if it requires reasonable work accommodations 
of the kind sought by Young for pregnancy-caused disabilities, may not cover all types of benefit 




 It may be more likely, however, that the issue addressed in this essay 
will arise again under one of the other two principal federal antidiscrimination 
statutes, the ADA and the ADEA, both of which share with religious practice 
and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, the asymmetric and non-
universalistic characteristics that make defining disparate treatment most 
difficult. The 2008 amendments to the former statute88 may render it 
especially likely to present a case where an employer discriminates against a 
protected group, defined by disability status, by including the protected group 
within a larger, neutrally defined disfavored group. The 2008 amendments 
(ADAAA) make this more likely because they enlarge the ADA’s class 
protected from employment discrimination – in contrast to those due 
reasonable accommodation -- to include anyone with an impairment, 
regardless of any limitation of a major life activity.89 Since regulations under 
the ADA define impairment to include “[a]ny physiological disorder or 
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one of more 
body systems” or “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder,”90 an employer’s 
disfavoring of the overweight or the underweight or the short or the tall or the 
less mentally adroit or physically attractive almost certainly will discriminate 
against a subset of protected impaired individuals. An employer that refuses 
to employ the physically unattractive for certain public interface jobs, for 
instance, might assign anyone with a “cosmetic disfigurement” to this larger 
disfavored class.91 The Court then may be confronted again, perhaps more 
directly and with greater focus, with arguments that such discrimination 
should be treated as intentional discrimination under disparate treatment 
analysis, rather than merely as the disparate impact of a neutral policy.  
     
                                                 
weekly benefits for certain kinds of disabilities, but not others. See 42 U.S.C.§ 12201 (c) (allowing 
employers to establish and administer otherwise legal bona fide benefit plans that are not a “subterfuge to 
evade the purposes” of the Act). 
88 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub.L. 110-325, Sept. 25, 2008, 122 Stat. 3553, codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.  
89 The ADAAA effects this enlargement by defining the category of “regarded as having … an impairment” 
protected from discrimination as a disability to include those having “an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A), as amended by ADAAA, § 4. The ADAAA, however, also clarifies that this 
enlargement does not extend to the definition of those due reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 
12201(h).  
90 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). 
91 For another example, see TAN 31-32 supra.  
